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Whether Disclosure of Work Product
to a Witness in Preparation for
Testifying Waives the Protection of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3)
INTRODUCTION
Federal courts are divided on the question of whether work
product protection' is waived by disclosing work product to a
witness to prepare him for testifying.2 This Comment will analyze
the issue and suggest a resolution. First, a general discussion of
work product protection since Hickman v TaylorP will be pre-
sented.4 A discussion of the various means of waiving the pro-
tection by disclosure to a witness in preparation for testifying
I Rule 26(b)(3) provides in part:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may
obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable
under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of liti-
gation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety,
iidemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation .of the
party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the
court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclu-
sions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of
a party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P 26(b)(3).
2 Compare James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982)
and Bailey v. Meister Bran, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (protection waived) with
United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and Bloch
v. Smithkline Beckman Corp., No. 82-510 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 1987) (protection not
waived).
1 329 U.S. 495 (1947). For a "classic" academic discussion of the work product
protection see Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv L. Ray. 940 (1961).
4 See mfra notes 7-32 and accompanying text.
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will follow 5 Finally, a resolution of the conflict among the
courts will be addressed. 6
I. BACKGROUND: THE WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION
The Supreme Court first recogmzed the work product doc-
trine in Hickman v Taylor 7 The case involved an attorney,
Fortenbaugh, who was hired in anticipation of litigation by the
owners of a sunken tug. Fortenbaugh interviewed the survivors
of the accident. Nearly a year later litigation ensued, and the
plaintiff sought discovery of Fortenbaugh's notes from the in-
terviews. In rejecting the plaintiff's request, the Court described
"work product" and the reason it should be protected:
This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements,
memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, per-
sonal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways-
aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
in this case as the "work product of the lawyer." Were such
materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of
what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An
attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his
own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inev-
itably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the prepa-
ration of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession
would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and
the cause of justice would be poorly served.8
More than twenty years after the landmark Hickman deci-
sion, the Supreme Court incorporated the work product doctrine
into Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). 9 A brief analysis
of the rule provides a foundation from which to build a discus-
sion concerning waiver of work product protection. First, Rule
26(b)(3) is subject to the provisions of 26(b)(1), which allows
discovery of unprivileged matter relevant to the pending action, 10
5 See infra notes 33-107 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 108-26 and accompanying text.
329 U.S. 495 (1947).
9 Id. at 511.
s FED. R. Civ. P 26(b)(3).
10 "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not pnvileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved m the pending action. " Id. at 26(b)(1).
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and 26(b)(4), which authorizes the discovery of "facts known
and opimons held by experts."'" Second, work product includes
"documents and tangible things."' 2 Tird, the documents must
be "prepared in anticipation of litigation. ' 13 Fourth, the party
seeking discovery must show "substantial need" for the material
sought to be discovered, 4 and "undue hardship" in obtalnng
the material by other means.' s Fifth, the rule provides special
" (A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to
identify each person whom the other expects to call as an expert witness
at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to
testify and a summary of the grounds for each opimon.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert
who has been retained and is not expected to be called as a witness
at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discov-
ery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
Id. at 26(b)(4).
Rule 26(b)(3) begins: "Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule,
a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable
under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule. " Id. at 26(b)(3).
2 Id. (emphasis added); cf. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (emphasis added) ("count-
less other tangible and intangible ways").
,3 FED. R. Crv P 26(b)(3). Thus, documents prepared in the "normal course of
business" are not protected. United States v. 22.80 Acres of Land, 107 F.R.D. 20, 24
(N.D. Cal. 1985). "Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant
to public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are
not under the qualified immunity provided by this subdivision." FnD. R. Civ. P 26(b)(3)
advisory committee's note (citing Goosman v. Dine Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir.
1963)). But, if the documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation and the litigation
has since terminated, the documents are still protected. In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326,
334 (8th Cir. 1977). There is "a perpetual protection for work product, one that extends
beyond the termination of the litigation for which the documents were prepared." Id.
Contra Levingston v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 109 F.R.D. 546, 552 (S.D. Miss. 1985)
(work product protection should not extend to subsequent litigation if the prior litigation
is "wholly unrelated").
14 FED. R. Crv P 26(b)(3). "Some cases have found substantial need by empha-
sizing the importance of the documents themselves." In re Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp.
Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1241 (5th Cir. 1982). Another "common justification for
discovery is the claim which relates to the opposite party's knowledge that can only be
shown by the documents themselves." Id. (citing Bird v. Penn Cent. Co., 61 F.R.D. 43
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 296 F Supp.
979, 983 (E.D. Wis. 1969)).
11 FED. R. Civ. P 26(b)(3). A party is expected to attempt to "obtain the
information he seeks by deposition." Int'l Sys., 693 F.2d at 1240. That party, however,
may "demonstrate undue hardship if the witness cannot recall the events in question,
or is unavailable." Id. (citing Xerox v. I.B.M. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 382 (S.D.N.Y.
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protection "against disclosure of the mental impressions, con-
clusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation. ' 16 Sixth, and
finally, the requirements of "substantial need." 1 7 and "undue
hardship" ' have an exception: a party or a person not a party
is relieved of the requisite showing if he is requesting a copy of
Ins own statement. 19
Given this analysis, a "flowchart" can be constructed to
clarify the discussion of work product cases.20 The first question
is whether the material sought to be discovered falls within the
definition of "work product" under Rule 26(b)(3). 21 If the ma-
terial falls outside the definition of work product, the material
is not protected and may be discovered pursuant to the discovery
rules.Y If the material is considered work product, the second
question is whether the party seeking discovery falls within the
"own statement" exception.2 If the exception applies, the party
may obtain the desired material.2 If the exception does not
1974)). Unusual expense is another factor that a "court may consider in determining
undue hardship." Id. at 1241 (citing Allen v. Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 32 F.R.D.
616, 617 (W.D. Mo. 1963)).
'6 FED. R. Crv P 26(b)(3); see J. FRiEDENTHEL, M. KAN, & A. MLLER, CiVi
PROCEDURE § 7.5 (1985) ("Mental impressions of the attorney enjoy the highest level of
protection under the work product doctrine, but even they may be revealed, at least
in part, upon a sufficient showing."); see also Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510 ("Not even
the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and
the mental impressions of an attorney."); Murphy, 560 F.2d at 334 ("The rule establishes
a qualified immunity for ordinary work product-that which does not contain the mental
impressions of the attorney. Rule 26(b)(3) provides special protection for an
attorney's opimon work product.").
17 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
11 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
"9 FED. R. Civ P 26(b)(3). The exception which allows a party to obtain his own
statement is "justified by the fact that a party's statement always may be used as direct
evidence at trial by an opposing party, whether or not the party who made the statement
is called to the witness stand." J. FEJEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. M=R, supra note 16,
at 389. The reason for the exception regarding a non-party witness "is to allow the
witness to avoid embarrassment at trial by being confronted with statements inconsistent
with the testimony given." Id.
0This "flowchart" is somewhat oversimplified but suitable for the purposes of
this Comment.
21 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
22 See FED. R. Civ. P 26-37.
23 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
2FED. R. Crv P 26(b)(3).
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apply, the next question is whether the material is "ordinary"
work product or "opinion" work product. 2 If the material
reveals "opinion" work product, the party seeking discovery will
have considerable difficulty making the required showings under
the rule.26 If the material is "ordinary" work product, the fourth
question is whether the party seeking discovery can make the
required showings of substantial need and undue hardsip.27 If
the requisite showings can be made, then the material is discov-
erable.Y If the party seeking discovery cannot make the requisite
showings, the materials may still be discoverable if the other
party has waived work product protection.29
The rationale behind work product protection provides a
foundation for the discussion of waiver. "Preserving the privacy
of preparation that is essential to the attorney's adversary role
is the central justification for the work product doctrine." 30 The
Hickman Court recognized the importance of this privacy- "In
perfornmng his various duties, it is essential that a lawyer
work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary
intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel." ' 31 Commenta-
tors agree that the purpose of the work product doctrine is to
preserve the adversary system by permitting attorneys to prepare
their cases without fear of interference by opposing counsel.32
2 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
2 See supra note 16; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401-02
(1980). Opinion work product "cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of substantial
need and undue hardship." Id. The Court refused to say that opinion work product
enjoys absolute protection. Nevertheless, the Court thought that a "far stronger showing
of necessity and unavailability by other means" was required for disclosing materials
that reveal an attorney's mental processes. Id.
See supra notes 14-15.
FED. R. Civ P 26(b)(3).
29 See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
" Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 232
(1985) (emphasis added).
32 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11. "Were such materials open to opposing counsel
on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten.
Inefficiency, unfairness, and sharp practices would inevitably develop." Id. at 511.
32 See J. FRrEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MniER, supra note 16, at 386-87 (Work
product doctrine is "based on the idea that every attorney should feel free to investigate
all aspects of a case without fear that the opposing party simply could obtain
unfavorable matters and put them to use."); 4 J. Mooan, J. LucAs, & G. GROTHEER,
Mooit's FEDna.u PRACTiCE 26.64[4] (2d ed. 1987) ("[T]he primary purpose of work
product protection is to safeguard the adversary process. ").
1987-88]
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II. WAIVER OF WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION
Although work product protection is not a true privilege, 3
many courts still refer to it as a privilege. 34 Whether it is viewed
as a privilege or a protection, the protection it affords is not
absolute and may be waived by disclosing the work product to
a witness in preparation for trial. 35
A. Waiver Generally
Work product protection is distinct from the attorney-client
privilege, 36 which protects the confidential communications be-
tween attorneys and their clients.37 Therefore, waiver of the latter
does not entail waiver of the former. 38 Nevertheless, work prod-
" One commentator stated:
[The difference between the work-product exception to discovery, and the
exception for privileged matter should be kept in mind. Privileged mfor-
mation is immune totally from discovery, no matter how compelling the
need for the information seems to be. Information that is collected in
anticipation of litigation or trial is protected from discovery, but that
protection may yield to a showing of need on the part of the requesting
party.
J. FRiEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MLER, supra note 16, at 387. For a good discussion
of the work product protection generally and of its "non-privileged" character, see
Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine: Protection, Not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917 (1983).
-' See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237-38 (1975) (Court characterizes
the Hickman opimon as establising a "qualified privilege" or a "privileged area" for
the attorney); United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 295 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1985); In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Western Fuels Ass'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 102 F.R.D. 201, 203 (D. Wyo. 1984).
35 Nobles, 422 U.S. at 239. Although Nobles is a criminal case, it has been cited
often in civil actions for the proposition that the protection of 26(b)(3) is not absolute
and can be waived. See Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Colo. 1983) ("Mhe
protection is not absolute, and it can be waived."); American Standard, Inc. v.
Bendix Corp., 71 F.R.D. 443, 446 (W.D. Mo. 1976) ("It is true that the immunity for
the work product doctrine can be waived.").
See generally E. CtARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1984) (a compre-
hensive discussion of attorney-client privilege).
37 Id.
3' In re Grand Jury, 106 F.R.D. 255, 257 (D.N.H. 1985). The court, in a criminal
action, was faced with an unusual situation regarding the requested material. The client
had waived his attorney-client privilege but his attorney asserted work product protection
to avoid turmng over the client's file. The court said:
Although only confidential communications between the attorney and client
are protected by the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine
may encompass any document prepared in anticipation of litigation by or
[VoL. 76
1987-881 DISCLOSURE OF WORK PRODUCT
uct protection clearly "may be waived by disclosure."3 9 Al-
though a majority of the courts do not follow a "per se waiver"
rule, 4° some courts have gone so far as to suggest that any
disclosure of work product which is not "between counsel on
the same side of litigation ' 4i is a waiver. 42
All courts agree, however, that disclosure to an adversary
clearly waives work product protection. 4 Even when disclosure
is inadvertent, the policy behind work product mimunity44 "would
not be harmed in the least by permitting the immumty to be
for the attorney. Further, the attorney-client privilege belongs to .the client
alone while the work product doctrine may be asserted by either the client
or the attorney.
Id. at 256 (citing In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979)). The
differences between the attorney-client privilege and the work product protection led the
court to conclude that the "defendant's waiver of the attorney-client privilege does not
necessarily mean that the protection afforded by the work product doctrine is also
breached." Id. at 257 (citing Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F Supp. 926,
929 (N.D., Cal. 1976)).
Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Titanium Metals Corp., 91 F.R.D. 84, 89 (E.D.N.Y.
1981) (emphasis added). The court also noted that "there appears to be no per se waiver
rule." Id.
"See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. 46, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(the rule that voluntary disclosure constitutes a per se, waiver of the work product
protection "is inconsistent with the rule accepted by the majority of courts."). Signifi-
cantly, D'Ippolito, Philadelphia Electric Co., and B & C Trucking Co. were all decided
before the 1970 enactment of Rule 26(b)(3). See infra notes 41-42. Prior to 1970, the
standard for discoverability of work product was "good cause" under Rule '34. See,
e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co., 275 F Supp. at 148.
" D'Ippolito v. Cities Serv. Co., 39 F.R.D. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The plaintiff
had "voluntarily disclosed" an exhibit to attorneys from the Justice Department and
the defendant sought discovery. The court said: "The government is not a party to this
lawsuit, and the disclosure of the document cannot be termed as an ,interchange of
information between counsel on the same side of the litigation." Id. The court then
concluded: "Any privilege that may have attached was destroyed by the voluntary act
of disclosure." Id; see Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co.* 275 F Supp.
146, 148 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (citing D'Ippolito for the proposition that "disclosure to third
parties destroys the privilege"); B & C Trucking Co. v. Holmes & Narver, .Inc., 39
F.R.D. 317, 319 (D. Haw. 1966) (disclosure to the Atomic Energy Commission, a third
party not a party in the litigation, waived the "work product privilege").
42 Id.
4 See In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d at 1372 (disclosure to an adversary
waives the protection of the materials disclosed regarding the adversaries in the same
action as well as those in subsequent litigation on the "very same matters disclosed");
see also infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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waived where the attorney fails to take any of the available steps
to preserve the confidentiality of the work product." 45
B. Waiver Through Witness Preparation: Experts
In general, work product protection may be waived. A more
specific issue is whether the protection may be waived through
the preparation of expert witnesses. Work product protection is
subject to Rule 26(b)(4) regarding discovery of expert opimons.4
The court in Boring v Keller47 held that disclosure of work
product to an expert waives the protection of Rule 26(b)(3). 4s
The defendant's attorney, Pryor, had prepared a summary of
the plaintiff's depositions which contained Pryor's impressions
and evaluations of the plaintiff as a witness. Pryor provided this
summary to the defendant's second expert witness. The court
concluded that this disclosure was sufficient to allow discovery
because, without the documents, the plaintiff's attorney would
"not have the opportunity to impeach the expert witnesses at
cross-examination. ' 49 This reason was sufficient to compel dis-
covery even of opinion work product.50 Although a stronger
showing of "substantial need" and "undue hardship" is re-
quired for discovery of opimon work product, 51 the court made
no explicit reference to such a showing in this case. The court
suggested that mere disclosure of opimon work product to an
expert witness is sufficient to compel discovery 52 The logic of
the Boring court has been criticized, 53 and was implicitly rejected
in Bogosian v Gulf Oil Corp.54
4s Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
" FED. R. Civ P 26(b)(3). Work product protection is "subject to the provisions
of subdivision (b)(4) of tis rule." Id; see supra note 1. See supra note 11 for a
discussion of discovery of expert opinions under Rule 26(b)(4).
97 F.R.D. 404 (D. Col. 1983).
4' Id. at 407-08.
41 Id. at 408.
"' See supra notes 16, 26 and accompanying text.
51 Id.
2 Boring, 97 F.R.D. at 407.
5 See, e.g., Note, Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of
Attorney Opinion Work Product Provided to an Expert Witness, 53 FoRais L. Rav.
1159, 1165 (1985) (arguing that "opinion work product utilized by an expert witness m
preparation for trial should be absolutely immune from discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)").
738 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1984).
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The Bogosian court rejected the notion that the language at
the beginning of Rule 26(b)(3) which subjects work product
protection to the provisions of 26(b)(4) 5 applies to opimon work
product.5 6 The court held that the language in question only
applies to "the first sentence of Rule 26(b)(3)."157 The court then
concluded that the language:
does not limit the second sentence of Rule 26(b)(3) restricting
disclosure of work product containing "mental impressions"
and "legal theories." Thus, it does not support the district
court's conclusion that Rule 26(b)(3), protecting this category
of attorney's work product, "must give way" to Rule 26(b)(4),
authonzing discovery relating to expert witnesses.58
Between Boring and Bogosian, Bogosian appears to be the more
logical view 59 "A rule prohibiting disclosure of opinion work
product sought under Rule 26(b)(4) better effectuates the policies
underlying the work product doctrine." 6° Of course, "facts that
the expert used in reaching his findings are readily discovera-
ble." 6'
C. Waiver Through Witness Preparation: "Memory
Refreshment"
Just as there is debate over whether work product protection
is waived through disclosure to an expert witness, 62 there is also
debate over whether disclosure to a witness to "refresh" his
memory should waive work product protection. 63 Federal Rule
" See supra note 11.
Bogostan, 738 F.2d at 594.
17 Id. (emphasis added).
11 Id. (emphasis added).
", See Note, supra note 53, at 1168-74 for a forceful argument against the waiver
notion expounded by the Boring court.
0Id. at 1180 (emphasis added).
61 Id. (emphasis added); see Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 595 (when same document
contains both facts and legal theories, adversary may discover the facts); supra note 11
(facts known by expert are discoverable under 26(b)(4)).
"2 See supra notes 46-61.
", See Note, Interactions Between Memory Refreshment Doctrine and Work Prod-
uct Protection Under the Federal Rules, 88 YAlE L.J. 390 (1978). Most of the significant
cases addressing this issue, however, have been decided since the note was published.
See infra notes 69-107.
1987-881
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of Evidence 612, the "memory refreshment" doctrine, embodies
an adversary's rights with respect to a writing used to refresh
the memory of a witness "for the purpose of testifying." 64 The
danger of concluding that memory refreshment does waive work
product protection is that "Rule 612 becomes a- rule of
discovery ' 65 rather than a rule of evidence. 66 The purpose of
Rule 612 is to "promote the search of credibility and memory," '67
not to be used as a device for "wholesale exploration of an
opposing party's files." ' 6  On the other hand, the danger of
concluding that waiver does not result is that "an attorney could
obtain an unfair advantage over a cross-exanumng attorney at a
deposition by the simple expedient of using privileged documents
prior to the deposition to refresh the witness' recollection, es-
pecially where the documents might improperly shade the wit-
ness' testimony "69
Before discussing the views on both sides of the waiver issue,
it should be noted that a neutral approach may be taken. It has
been suggested- that the court review the disputed materials in
camera to determine whether they should be disclosed. 70 In S &
[I]f a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the purpose of
testifying, either-
1) while testifying, or
2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is nec-
essary in the interests ofjustice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing,
to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in
evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness.
FED. R. Evm. 612. See generally 3 J. WEINSmEIN & M. BERGER, WENSTEmN's EVIDENCE
612101] (1987) (a general discussion of the development of memory refreshment
doctnne).
61 Note, supra note 63, at 400; see Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 317-18 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 232 (1985); S & A Painting Co., Inc. v. O.W.B. Corp., 103
F.RD. 407, 409. (W.D. Pa. 1984). Rule 612 might then be used to discover "everything
shown to a witness prior to hIs testimony, whether used to refresh memory or not."
Note, supra note 63, at 400.
" Id.
7FED. R, Evm. 612 advisory committee's note.
"Id.
" Bloch v. Smithkline Beckman Corp., No. 82-510 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 1987), slip
op. at 5-4.
70 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 64, at 612104].
Until such time as the Supreme Court decides these issues, the following
approach is suggested. If the adverse party demands material which the
[VoL  76
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A Painting Co. v 0. W.B. Corp.,7 the court ordered the plain-
tiff to deliver a copy of the notes used by the witness during
testimony for in camera inspection. Following such inspection,
the court may "then order disclosure of all portions of the notes
to which [the witness] referred during the deposition as estab-
lished by the transcript." 72 The Bogostan court, however, suc-
cinctly noted the real problem with in camera inspections.
Although there are a "few situations where . in camera
inspection . . is unavoidable," 73 the court pointed out that
"district courts are overburdened with discovery matters, and
most disputed issues are capable of resolution between attorneys
if a serious attempt is made to do so." 74 Thus, in camera
inspection of every "work product-memory refreshment" dis-
pute would not be an effective solution.
One of the first cases to address the issue of memory refresh-
ment and work product protection was Berkey Photo, Inc. v
Eastman Kodak Co.75 The court stated that because "counsel
were not vividly aware of the potential for a stark choice between
withholding the notebooks from the experts or turning them
over to opposing counsel, ' 76 the request for discovery would be
demed. 77 But, the court warned that similar disclosure in the
future likely would be considered a waiver.7 8
party producing the witness claims reflects solely the attorney's thought
processes, the judge should examine the material in camera. Unless the
judge finds that the adverse party would be hampered in testing the
accuracy of the witness' testimony, he should not order production of any
writings which reflect solely the attorney's mental processes.
Id.
7 103 F.R.D. 407 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
72 Id. at 410. The magistrate m Barrer v. Women's Nat'l Bank, 96 F.R.D. 202
(D.D.C. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 761 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir. 1985), made a similar
order so as to "strike a balance between plaintiff's interest in discovering any evidence
favorable to hum and the defendant's interest in protecting the attorney-client relationship
[and attorney work product]." Id. at 205.
" Bogostan, 738 F.2d at 596.
71 Id. at 595-96.
7 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). For a comprehensive analysis of this case, see
Note, supra note 63.





The court's warning in Berkey, in time, came true. The court
in James Julian, Inc. v Raytheon Co. 79 held that disclosing
work product to prepare a witness for deposition constituted a
waiver of the protection. 0 Reasoning that waiver would be in
the "interests of justice" 8' pursuant to Rule 612,82 the court
concluded: "Without reviewing those binders defendants' coun-
sel cannot know or inquire into the extent to which the witness'
testimony has been shaded by counsel's presentation of the
factual background.''83
However, the warning of Berkey 4 and the holding m James
Julian85 have not been the trend in recent cases.86 The court m
Sporck v Pei87 refused to order disclosure of the document
allegedly used to prepare a witness for deposition. 8 Because the
party seeking disclosure had "failed to establish either that pe-
titioner relied on any documents in giving his testimony, or that
those documents influenced his testimony," 89 the court con-
cluded that "counsel failed to lay a proper foundation under
Rule 612 for production of the documents."' 9 Thus, because
there was no conflict between Rule 612 and Rule 26(b)(3), no
waiver resulted. 91
In one of the most recent cases involving memory refresh-
ment and waiver of work product protection, Bloch v Smithk-
line Beckman Corp. ,92 the court refused to permit discovery of
a witness' statement, which was reviewed by the witness prior
to testifying at a deposition. 93 The court said:
The work product doctnne need not be viewed as conflicting
with Federal Rule of Evidence 612, and courts need not choose
79 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982).
0 Id. at 146.
11 See supra note 64.
$2 See James Julian, Inc., 93 F.R.D. at 146.
83 Id.
14 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
"1 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
,' See Sporck, 759 F.2d at 318; Bloch, No. 82-510, slip op. at 5-6.





9 No. 82-510 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 1987).
9, Id., slip op. at 1-2, 10.
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one over the other. Before a document may be disclosed under
Rule 612(2), [the] provision which focuses upon use of docu-
ments before testifying, the court in its discretion must deter-
mine that disclosure is necessary in the interest of justice. 94
The court then found that although the witness' "memory may
have been aided by his reading of the document, the document
had not been given to him for the purpose of preparing hm for
the deposition." 95
For both the Sporck and the Bloch courts, there was no
conflict between Rule 612 and Rule 26(b)(3) because the prere-
quisites of Rule 612 were not met.96 For this reason, neither
court permitted disclosure of the documents in question. 97 The
court in In re Comair Air Disaster Litigation,9 however, took a
somewhat different approach. The court noted that Rule 612
and Rule 26(b)(3) could be "read in harmony with each other." 99
After suggesting that work product should be discoverable only
when the party seeking discovery makes the required showings
of "substantial need"' 1  and "undue hardship," 0 1 the court
stated:
When, however, a witness has used such materials to refresh
his recollection prior to testifying, [Rule] 612 weights the bal-
ance in favor of findings that the "substantial need" exists,
because of the policy in favor of effective cross-examination. 02
9Id., slip op. at 4.
9, Id., slip op. at 7 (emphasis added).
Sporck, 759 F.2d at 318; Bloch, No. 82-510, slip op. at 4. The prerequisites of
Rule 612 have been set forth: "1) the witness must use the writing to refresh his memory;
2) the witness must use the writing for the purpose of testifying; and 3) the court must
determine that production is necessary in the interest of justice." Sporck, 759 F.2d at
317.
17Id. at 312; Bloch, No. 82-510, slip op. at 10.
100 F.R.D. 350 (E.D. Ky. 1983).
" Id. at 353; cf. Sporck, 759 F.2d at 318 ("Rule 612, therefore, when properly
applied, does not conflict with the protection of attorney v qrk product of the type
involved in this case."); Bloch, No. 82-510, slip op. at 4 ("The w'ork-product doctrine
need not be viewed as conflicting with Federal Rule of Evidence 612. ").
110 See supra note 14.
'M' See supra note 15.
112 In re Comair Air Disaster Litig., 100 F.R.D. at 353.
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The court also allowed discovery on the basis of the "interests
of justice" language of Rule 612.103
The most important point made by the Comair court is that
the invocation of Rule 612 does not imply a waiver of the work
product protection, but merely "weights the balance in favor of
finding" that the required showings of Rule 26(b)(3) have been
met.10 4 Theoretically, this approach is much more logical than
the notion of waiver, because Rule 612 is not converted into a
rule of discovery 105 Rather, a party seeking disclosure of mate-
rials under Rule 612 must first make the required showings under
Rule 26(b)(3)106 before discovery will be allowed.1°7
III. RESOLVING THE ISSUE
Disclosing work product to a witness in preparation for
testifying may waive the protection of Rule 26(b)(3). 101 In this
way, work product protection is similar to the attorney-client
privilege.109 The reason for the attorney-client privilege, however,
is "to secure a more general privacy for confidential commum-
cations. Therefore, when the privileged commumcation is made
sufficiently public, for example by disclosure to a third person,
113 Id; see supra note 64 (according to Rule 612, adverse party is entitled to writing
used by witness to refresh his memory before testifying if the court "determines it is
necessary in the interests of justice").
,04 In re Comair Air Disaster Litig., 100 F.R.D. at 353.
105 See supra note 65-68 and accompanying text.
,16 See supra notes 14-15. This is assuming that the materials in question are deemed
to be work product.
107 In re Comair Air Disaster Litig., 100 F.R.D. at 353; see S & A Painting Co.,
103 F.R.D. at 409 ("Allowing disclosure under Rule 612 of documents protected by the
work product doctrine circumvents the requirement of 'substantial need' and 'undue
hardship' prior to discovery under Rule 26(b)(3)."); J. WEiNsT-iN & M. BERGER, supra
note 64, at 612[04] ("Given the liberality of disclosure and the work-product exception
in the discovery rules, the opponent should be required to make some showing of need
in order to obtain materials which a witness reviewed before a deposition instead of
achieving wholesale disclosure." (emphasis added)).
'I' See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975); see also Boring v. Keller,
97 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Col. 1983) ("[Ihe protection is not absolute, and can be
waived."); American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 71 F.R.D. 443, 446 (W.D. Mo.
1976) ("It is true that the mununity of the work product doctrine can be waived."); J.
MooRE, J. Lucks, & G. GROTHEER, supra note 32, at 26.64[4] ("Work product
immunity can be waived.").
109 J. MooRE, J. LucAs, & G. GROTHEER, supra note 32, at 26.64[4].
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the pnvilege may justifiably be considered waived."' 10 On the
other hand, the rationale of work product protection is to "pro-
mote the effectiveness of the lawyer's trial preparations." '' In
other words, "[p]reserving the privacy of preparation that is
essential to the attorney's adversary role is the central justifica-
tion for the work product doctrine.""12 Thus:
The policies supporting the concept do not seem to require
general secrecy, but merely secrecy from possible adversaries.
In so far as trial preparations may be commumcated to third
persons without, substantially increasing the opportunities for
potential adversaries to obtain the information, it seems that
the work product protection should continue. Therefore, dis-
closure of work product materials to people with a general
common interest, such as business advisers of a client, does
not warrant the conclusion that the protection has been
waived."13
For these reasons, there is little doubt that disclosure to an
adversary waives the work product protection.
Most courts follow the rule that "disclosure of a document
to third persons does not waive the work product immunity
unless it has substantially increased the opportunities for poten-
tial adversaries to obtain the information." 4 Along with this
Developments in the Law-Discovery, supra note 3, at 1045.
' Id.
Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 232
(1985).
Developments in the Law-Discovery, supra note 3, at 1045 (citations omitted).
"' Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CoiwaN- L. Rnv. 760, 886
(1983) (quoting 8 C. W~iuorr & A. MmrERm, FEERAL PRAT IcE AND PROCEDURE § 2024
(1970)); see Western Fuels Ass'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 102 F.R.D. 201, 203 (D. Wyo.
1984) (waiver may result from disclosure of work product "to third parties in such a
manner as is inconsistent with the purpose of maintaining the secrecy of such information
from current or potential adversaries."); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated December
18, 1981 and January 4, 1982, 561 F Supp. 1247, 1257 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Disclosure
of work product to a third party does not waive its protection unless it substantially
increases the opportunity for potential adversaries to obtain the information."); GAF
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. 46, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[O]nly if such
disclosure substantially increases the possibility that an opposing party could obtain the
information disclosed will the disclosing party's work product privilege be deemed
waived."); American Standard, Inc., 71 F.R.D. at 446 (quoting C. WRoHr & A. MILLR,
supra this note, at § 2024); Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfg., Inc., 47
F.R.D. 334, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ("The work product privilege should not be deemed




view a "common interests" corollary has arisen." 5 This majority
view and its corollary may provide an acceptable solution to the
problem of waiver.
The leading case addressing the "common interests" corol-
lary is United States v American Telephone and Telegraph Co.1 6
MCI had given documents prepared m anticipation of litigation
to the government. AT&T sought discovery of these documents.
Because MCI was not a party to the case, it could not assert
work product protection.1 7 In addition, because the United States
had not prepared the documents, it also could not assert work
product protection.1' 8 This imtial problem was avoided by allow-
ing MCI to intervene, at which time it asserted work product
protection to prevent discovery of the documents." 9 The court
was then faced with the question of whether MCI's disclosure
of the documents to the Umted States pnor to intervention
would constitute a waiver of the protection. 20 The court traced
the development of the "common interests" corollary 2 ' and
criticized the narrowness of some holdings.'2 The court then
concluded that when a person ("transferor") transfers work
product to another ("transferee"), it is the:
existence of "common interests" between transferor and trans-
feree [that] is relevant to deciding whether the disclosure is
consistent with the nature of the work product privilege. But
"common interests" should not be construed as narrowly lim-
ited to co-parties. So long as transferor and transferee antici-
pate litigation against a common adversary on the same issue
or issues, they have strong common interests in sharing the
fruit of the trial preparation efforts. Moreover, with common
Mt Special Project, supra note 114, at 887-88.
"6 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
"7 Id. at 1297.
118 Id.
119 Id.
'2 Id. at 1298.
"I Id. at 1298-99.
'2 Id. at 1299. The court felt that limiting the concept of "common interests" to
co-parties, "parallels the strict standard applied for waiver of the attorney-client pnvi-
lege," which is based on different reasons from the work product privilege. Id. at 1299-
99; see supra note 38 (differences between the attorney-client privilege and the work
product protection); see also Stix Prods., Inc., 47 F.R.D. at 338 (in which the "presence
of a community of interest" obviated the claim of waiver).
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interests on a particular issue against a common adversary, the
transferee is not at all likely to disclose the work product
material to the adversary 123
The court noted that upon remand, it would be "open to the
district court to consider the substantial need 24 argument.' ' 25
Thus, even when there is no waiver of work product protection,
discovery may still be possible. 26
CONCLUSION
The obvious practical conclusion is that not disclosing work
product to witnesses will prevent questions of waiver from aris-
ing. Nevertheless, m situations in which work product must be
disclosed or has already been disclosed, strong arguments can
be advanced against waiver of work product protection. Clearly,
mere disclosure to a witness should not be a per se waiver. 27
Even when disclosure is to refresh the memory of a witness, the
policy of preventing Rule 612 from becoming a rule of discovery
suggests that no waiver results. 23 Nevertheless, the party seeking
discovery may find it easier to make the required showings under
Rule 26(b)(3) such that discovery could be ordered. 129 Finally,
the vast majority of courts will find a waiver only when work
product is disclosed to an adversary or to a third party who is
likely to transmit the work product to an adversary 130 Because
113 American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d at 1299. Also:
The majority rule, and its common interest corollary, comport well with
the work product doctnne's purpose of preventing disclosure to adversaries
in litigation but not to the world in general. The majority rule encourages
an attorney to prepare more fully for trial without fear of access by
adversaries, even when circumstances necessitate disclosure of work product
materials to third parties.
Special Project, supra note 114, at 888.
,24 See supra note 14.
125 American TeL & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d at 1302.
,26 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text; see also Burlington Indus. v.
Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 45 (D. Md. 1974) (when there is a "mutual interest," work
product protection is not waived; but "proper showing of the need-hardship" require-
ments would allow discovery).
'2 See supra notes 33-61 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
'29 See supra notes 62-107 and accompanying text.
, See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
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disclosure to a witness, or to anyone with a "common interest,"
is generally not likely to wind up in the hands of one's adversary,
the protection should not be considered waived. 31 The requisite
showing under Rule 26(b)(3) should always be made before
discovery is permitted.
Gene Lynn Humphreys
"I See supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
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